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PHIPPS, Circuit Judge. 
 
This case involves a dispute between a hospital and a 
federal agency over Medicare reimbursements.  The core 
controversy concerns the hospital’s geographical-area 
assignment for purposes of the wage index, which is used to 
calculate those reimbursements.  The hospital, located in the 
City of Philadelphia, received a reclassification into the New 
York City area, which would sizably increase the hospital’s 
Medicare reimbursements due to that area’s higher wage 
index.  Although a statute makes such reclassifications 
effective for three fiscal years, the agency updated the 
geographical boundaries for the New York City area before the 
close of that period.  After doing so, the agency reassigned the 
hospital to an area in New Jersey with an appreciably lower 
wage index. 
 
As a result of that reassignment, the hospital sued three 
agency officials in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania.  But 
the Medicare Act channels reimbursement disputes through 
administrative adjudication as a near-absolute prerequisite to 
judicial review.  And here, the hospital did not pursue its claim 
through administrative adjudication before suing in federal 
court.  By not following the statutory channeling requirement, 
the hospital has no valid basis for subject-matter 
jurisdiction.  Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s 
judgment in favor of the agency officials and remand with 
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instructions to dismiss the complaint for lack of subject-matter 
jurisdiction. 
I. BACKGROUND 
A. Statutory and Regulatory Framework  
Originally enacted in 1965 and later amended, the Medicare 
Act establishes a national health insurance program for persons 
65 and older who are eligible for Social Security benefits, as 
well as for persons with certain disabilities.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 426(a), (b).  See generally Social Security Amendments of 
1965 (Medicare Act), tit. XVIII, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 
286.  Through the Inpatient Prospective Payment System, the 
Medicare Part A Program reimburses hospitals for the 
operating costs of providing inpatient healthcare services to 
Medicare beneficiaries.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(2); see 
also id. § 1395ww(a)(4) (defining “operating costs of inpatient 
hospital services”).  The amount of the operating-cost 
reimbursement is calculated on a per-patient basis using 
predetermined, fixed rates for each treatment category.  See id. 
§ 1395ww(d)(2), (4); 42 C.F.R. § 412.2(a) (detailing the basis 
of payment per discharge).  Each year, the Secretary of Health 
and Human Services sets those fixed reimbursement rates.  See 
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(b)(3)(B), (d)(3)(A)–(C); 42 C.F.R. 
§ 412.64(d). 
 
Although they are set in advance, Medicare reimbursement 
rates are not uniform throughout the nation.  Instead, the 
Secretary annually adjusts the national reimbursement rate, see 
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(3), based on a wage index for different 
geographic areas, see id. § 1395ww(d)(3)(E)(i) (requiring the 
Secretary to adjust the proportion of a hospital’s costs 
“attributable to wages and wage-related costs” to reflect “the 
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relative hospital wage level in the geographic area of the 
hospital compared to the national average hospital wage 
level”); 42 C.F.R. § 412.64(h)(1) (“The wage index is updated 
annually.”). 
 
To group hospitals into geographic areas for calculating 
and applying the wage index, the Secretary has formally 
adopted regional designations from the Office of Management 
and Budget (OMB).  See, e.g., Fiscal Year 2021 Final Rule,1 
85 Fed. Reg. 58,432, 58,742 (Sept. 18, 2020); see also Bellevue 
Hosp. Ctr. v. Leavitt, 443 F.3d 163, 169 (2d Cir. 2006).  OMB 
calls those geographical regions Core Based Statistical Areas 
or CBSAs.  See Standards for Defining Metropolitan and 
Micropolitan Statistical Areas, 65 Fed. Reg. 82,228, 82,235–
36 (Dec. 27, 2000).  Each CBSA contains a county or counties 
with at least one population core of 10,000 persons, which may 
be joined with adjacent counties that are socially and 
economically integrated.  See id. at 82,236; 2010 Standards for 
Delineating Metropolitan and Micropolitan Statistical Areas, 
75 Fed. Reg. 37,246, 37,251 (June 28, 2010).  The Secretary 
calculates the annual wage index for each CBSA using “a 
 
1 The full title of the Fiscal Year 2021 Final Rule is “Medicare 
Program; Hospital Inpatient Prospective Payment Systems for 
Acute Care Hospitals and the Long-Term Care Hospital 
Prospective Payment System and Final Policy Changes and 
Fiscal Year 2021 Rates; Quality Reporting and Medicare and 
Medicaid Promoting Interoperability Programs Requirements 
for Eligible Hospitals and Critical Access Hospitals.”  Other 
relevant proposed and final rules feature titles of similar length.  
Such rules are referred to herein, not by their formal titles, but 




survey of wages and wage-related costs of short-term, acute 
care hospitals.”  Fiscal Year 2021 Final Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. at 
58,742.  Then, the Secretary adjusts Medicare reimbursement 
rates by the wage index applicable to each CBSA (or rural area 
outside any CBSA).  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(2)(H), 
(d)(3)(E); 42 C.F.R. § 412.64(h). 
 
1. Changes to a Hospital’s Assigned CBSA 
 
As relevant here, a hospital’s assignment to a particular 
CBSA may change through either of two events: an order 
granting a hospital’s application for geographic reclassification 
or reassignment by the Secretary, usually after adoption of 
OMB’s revised CBSA geographical boundaries.2 
 
A hospital may request reclassification into another CBSA 
through an application to the five-member Medicare 
Geographic Classification Review Board.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395ww(d)(10).  A requirement for reclassification is that 
the destination CBSA be within “close proximity” to the 
hospital.  42 C.F.R. § 412.230(b).  An “urban hospital” 
 
2 The Secretary is not required to adopt OMB’s CBSA 
boundaries and may define geographical boundaries 
differently for purposes of calculating the wage index.  See 
Bellevue Hosp., 443 F.3d at 175 (“[T]he statute is silent as to 
how this process is to take place, leaving the agency with broad 
discretion.”); Fiscal Year 2021 Final Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. at 
58,745 (“We concur with commenters that [the agency] is not 
bound by statute to adhere to OMB definitions or delineations 
in calculating the [Inpatient Prospective Payment System] 
wage index.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(3)(E)(i). 
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satisfies this proximity requirement by being within 15 miles 
of the target CBSA; a “rural hospital” must be within 35 miles 
of the target CBSA.  Id.  If the Board grants the reclassification 
application, then the hospital receives the wage index 
applicable to the target CBSA.  See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395ww(d)(10)(C)(i).  By statute, a reclassification is 
“effective for a period of 3 fiscal years,” unless the hospital 
elects to “terminate such reclassification before the end of such 
period.”  Id. § 1395ww(d)(10)(D)(v).  But if the Board denies 
the reclassification application, then the hospital may 
administratively appeal to the Secretary.  See id. 
§ 1395ww(d)(10)(C)(iii)(II) (incorporating the administrative 
appeal process from the Administrative Procedure Act, 
5 U.S.C. § 557(b)).  The Secretary’s decision “shall be final 
and shall not be subject to judicial review.”  Id. 
 
The Secretary may also reassign a hospital into a different 
CBSA after adopting revised CBSA boundaries.  OMB 
typically revises CBSA boundaries every ten years based on 
the results of the decennial census, but OMB sometimes makes 
interim revisions.  See Fiscal Year 2021 Final Rule, 85 Fed. 
Reg. at 58,743.  When OMB updates the CBSA boundaries, 
the Secretary often adopts those new regional groupings and 
calculates new wage indexes for the redrawn CBSAs.3   By 
doing so, the Secretary resolves the wage index for non-
reclassified hospitals: they receive the wage index for the 
 
3 See, e.g., Fiscal Year 2019 Final Rule, 83 Fed. Reg. 41,144, 
41,362–63 (Aug. 17, 2018) (incorporating the updates from 
OMB Bulletin No. 17-01, issued between censuses); Fiscal 
Year 2015 Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 49,854, 49,951 (Aug. 22, 
2014) (incorporating the updates from OMB Bulletin No. 13-
01, issued following publication of data from the 2010 census). 
 
8 
CBSA in which they are located.  But that does not resolve the 
fate of a hospital that was previously reclassified into a CBSA 
with later-redrawn boundaries.  See Fiscal Year 2021 Final 
Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. at 58,771 (explaining that “if CBSAs are 
split apart, or if counties shift from one CBSA to another under 
the revised OMB delineations, [the agency] must determine 
which reclassified area to assign to the hospital for the 
remainder of a hospital’s 3-year reclassification period if the 
area to which the hospital reclassified split or had counties shift 
to another new or modified urban CBSA”).  To assign such a 
hospital after the redrawing of CBSAs, the Secretary has 
followed a most-proximate-county policy.  See, e.g., Fiscal 
Year 2021 Final Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. at 58,771–72; Fiscal Year 
2015 Final Rule, 79 Fed. Reg. 49,854, 49,974–76 (Aug. 22, 
2014); Fiscal Year 2005 Final Rule, 69 Fed. Reg. 48,916, 
49,054–55 (Aug. 11, 2004).  Under that approach, the 
Secretary reassigns a previously reclassified hospital to the 
redrawn CBSA containing the county from the original CBSA 
that is closest to the hospital (as long as that county remains 
outside the CBSA in which the hospital is physically located).  
See Fiscal Year 2021 Final Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. at 58,771. 
 
2. Challenges to Medicare Reimbursements 
 
The Medicare Act also provides a mechanism for hospitals 
to dispute the amount of reimbursement that they receive for 
inpatient care.  Subject to timing and amount-in-controversy 
requirements, see 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(2)–(3), a hospital that 
receives reimbursements for the operating costs of inpatient 
services may challenge “a final determination of the Secretary 
as to the amount of the payment” through an appeal to another 
five-member board, the Provider Reimbursement Review 
Board.  Id. § 1395oo(a)(1)(A)(ii) (permitting a challenge to the 
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amount of payment made under subsections (b) or (d) of 
42 U.S.C. § 1395ww), (h) (defining the composition of the 
Provider Reimbursement Review Board); see also id. 
§ 1395ww(b) (providing for the computation and adjustment 
of payment for “the operating costs of inpatient hospital 
services”), (d) (providing the process for determining 
prospective rates for inpatient care reimbursements). 
   
Through such an appeal, a hospital may dispute not only 
the amount of its reimbursement but also the method for 
calculating that amount.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(1)(A)(ii); 
see also St. Francis Med. Ctr. v. Shalala, 32 F.3d 805, 812 (3d 
Cir. 1994) (recognizing that 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo “provides 
avenues by which a provider seeking Part A payments may 
contest both the amount of its payments and the methods by 
which those payments are calculated”).  And because the 
method for computing the reimbursement amount involves the 
wage index, a hospital may – in challenging “a final 
determination” as to the amount of its reimbursement – dispute 
the applicable wage index.  See, e.g., Good Samaritan Hosp. v. 
Shalala, 508 U.S. 402, 407 (1993) (“Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395oo, [six hospitals] filed an appeal to the Provider 
Reimbursement Review Board. . .  [challenging] the wage 
index . . . .”).  The Secretary has 60 days from the date of the 
Provider Reimbursement Review Board’s decision to revise 
the Board’s decision.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(1) (“A 
decision of the Board shall be final unless the Secretary, on his 
own motion, and within 60 days after the provider of services 
is notified of the Board’s decision, reverses, affirms, or 
modifies the Board’s decision.”). 
 
Final decisions of the Provider Reimbursement Review 
Board are subject to judicial review.  A hospital dissatisfied 
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with the Provider Reimbursement Review Board’s decision (or 
the Secretary’s revision) has 60 days to file a civil action 
challenging it in federal court.  See id.  To invoke that judicial-
review provision, a hospital must first present the 
reimbursement challenge to the Provider Reimbursement 
Review Board.  See Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, 
Inc., 529 U.S. 1, 24 (2000) (“At a minimum, however, the 
matter must be presented to the agency prior to review in a 
federal court.”).   
 
This avenue for judicial review operates in conjunction 
with the jurisdiction-stripping provision of the Social Security 
Act.  See 42 U.S.C. § 405(h).  That provision, through its 
application to the Medicare Act, see id. § 1395ii, precludes 
subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (federal-
question jurisdiction) and 28 U.S.C. § 1346 (jurisdiction over 
claims against the United States) for claims “arising under” the 
Medicare Act.  42 U.S.C. § 405(h).4   
 
Together, these statutes establish a “channeling 
requirement.”  Ill. Council, 529 U.S. at 19.  Although the 
 
4 Although not relevant to Temple’s present challenge to a 
determination in a table addendum to a final rule promulgated 
through the notice-and-comment process, the jurisdiction-
stripping provision further diminishes the opportunities for 
judicial review of challenges to the Secretary’s “findings and 
decision” made “after a hearing.”  42 U.S.C. § 405(h).  In such 
a circumstance, the Secretary’s “findings and decision” may 
not be “reviewed by any person, tribunal, or governmental 
agency” except as provided by the Social Security Act and the 
Medicare Act.  Id.; id. § 1395ii; see also Nichole Med. Equip. 
& Supply, Inc. v. TriCenturion, Inc., 694 F.3d 340, 346–47 
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jurisdiction-stripping provision eliminates federal-question 
jurisdiction for reimbursement claims arising under the 
Medicare Act, it leaves intact the judicial review provision of 
the Medicare Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(1).  Thus, as a 
general rule, claims for Medicare reimbursement must be 
channeled through the Provider Reimbursement Review Board 
before they may be challenged in court.  See Heckler v. Ringer, 
466 U.S. 602, 627 (1984) (“In the best of all worlds, immediate 
judicial access for all of these parties might be desirable. But 
Congress, in § 405(g) and § 405(h), struck a different balance, 
refusing declaratory relief and requiring that administrative 
remedies be exhausted before judicial review of the Secretary’s 
decisions takes place.”); see also Abington Mem’l Hosp. v. 
Heckler, 750 F.2d 242, 244 (3d Cir. 1984) (“Section 405(h) of 
the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(h), as incorporated 
into the Medicare Act by 42 U.S.C. § 1395ii, removes from the 
federal courts any jurisdiction over claims arising under the 
Medicare Act for reimbursement, except to the extent allowed 
in 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f).” (statutory years omitted)).   
 
Although the channeling requirement operates as near-
absolute bar to federal-question jurisdiction for claims arising 
under the Medicare Act that have not been challenged 
administratively, an exception exists.  When presentation of a 
challenge to the Provider Reimbursement Review Board 
“would not simply channel review through the agency, but 
would mean no review at all,” channeling is not required.  Ill. 
Council, 529 U.S. at 19; see Bowen v. Mich. Acad. of Fam. 
 
(3d Cir. 2012) (holding, in a case challenging the outcome of 
an agency hearing, that the “except as herein provided” clause 
of § 405(h) “bar[s] virtually all grants of jurisdiction under 
Title 28”).   
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Physicians, 476 U.S. 667 (1986) (originating this exception).  
This lone exception is quite “narrow.”  Taransky v. Sec’y of the 
U.S. Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 760 F.3d 307, 321 n.13 
(3d Cir. 2014).  It applies only when, “as applied generally to 
those covered by a particular statutory provision, hardship 
likely found in many cases turns what appears to be simply a 
channeling requirement into complete preclusion of judicial 
review.”  Ill. Council, 529 U.S. at 22–23.  A postponement of 
judicial review that would add “inconvenience or cost in an 
isolated, particular case” does not suffice.  Id. at 23. 
 
B. Factual Background and Procedural History 
 
Despite Temple University Hospital’s physical location 
within the Philadelphia CBSA, this dispute originates from a 
redrawing of the New York City CBSA.  In September 2018, 
OMB redefined the CBSA for New York City to no longer 
include three New Jersey counties – Middlesex, Monmouth, 
and Ocean.5  Those three counties were combined with a fourth 
– Somerset – to create a new CBSA, the New Brunswick-
 
5 See Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Off. of the President, 
OMB Bull. No. 18-04, Revised Delineations of Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas, Micropolitan Statistical Areas, and 
Combined Statistical Areas, and Guidance on Uses of the 
Delineations of These Areas 61 (2018) (referring to the New 
York City CBSA as the New York-Jersey City-White Plains, 
NY-NJ CBSA); see also Fiscal Year 2021 Final Rule, 85 Fed. 
Reg. at 58,746. 
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Lakewood, NJ CBSA.  See OMB Bull. No 18-04 at 61; see also 
Fiscal Year 2021 Final Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. at 58,746. 
 
Before the Secretary decided to adopt OMB’s proposed 
changes to these CBSAs, Temple applied for reclassification 
into the New York City CBSA.  See Reclassification Appl. 
(submitted on September 3, 2019) (JA40).  To achieve that 
result, Temple also requested designation as a rural hospital, 
which would enable it to use the 35-mile proximity 
requirement (instead of the 15-mile requirement for urban 
hospitals).  See 42 C.F.R. § 412.230(b).  With that designation, 
Temple would be within range of Monmouth County, which, 
at 34.7 miles away, was the nearest county in the then-defined 
New York City CBSA.   
 
On February 21, 2020, still before the Secretary decided to 
adopt OMB’s redrawn CBSAs, the Geographic Classification 
Review Board granted Temple’s reclassification request.  
Under that decision, Temple was to receive the wage index for 
the New York City CBSA for three fiscal years – from 2021 
through 2023 (October 1, 2020, through September 30, 2023).  
See Geographic Classification Rev. Bd. Decision (JA54); see 
also 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(10)(D)(v).  That represented an 
upgrade to Temple’s wage index: the New York City CBSA 
had a wage index of 1.3239 compared to the Philadelphia 
CBSA’s wage index of 1.06.  
 
Temple’s success did not last as long as anticipated.  Three 
months later, the Secretary provided notice of a proposed rule 
that would adopt OMB’s 2018 revisions to the CBSAs.  See 
Fiscal Year 2021 Proposed Rule, 85 Fed. Reg. 32,460, 32,696–
97 (May 29, 2020).  Under those proposed revisions, 
Monmouth County would transfer out of the New York City 
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CBSA and into the newly formed New Brunswick CBSA.  See 
OMB Bull. No 18-04 at 61.  As part of that notice, the Secretary 
proposed reassigning hospitals under the most-proximate-
county policy.  See Fiscal Year 2021 Proposed Rule, 85 Fed. 
Reg. at 32,717.  Of the counties in the original New York City 
CBSA, Monmouth County was the closest county to Temple.  
Thus, under the proposal, Temple would follow Monmouth 
County in its reassignment to the New Brunswick CBSA.  That 
CBSA, however, had a wage index of 1.0754 – appreciably 
lower than that of the New York City CBSA.  See id. at 32,720. 
 
The proposed rule also sought to mitigate the effects of the 
revised CBSA boundaries.  One proposal was a transitional 
wage index for affected reclassified hospitals that would cap at 
five percent the wage-index decrease for the first year of the 
revised CBSAs.  See id. at 32,718.  Another proposal would 
allow a hospital to seek further reassignment to a CBSA that 
contained at least one county from its prior reclassified CBSA 
– as long as the hospital met the proximity requirements for 
that county.  See id. at 32,720; see also 42 C.F.R. § 412.230(b).  
The notice of the proposed rule also reminded reclassified 
hospitals of the opt-out option: they could elect to terminate 
reclassification and return to their home CBSA, where they are 
physically located.  See 85 Fed. Reg. at 32,717. 
 
After publication of that notice, Temple followed a course 
not mentioned among the proposed mitigation measures.  It 
applied for reclassification into another CBSA – the Vineland-
Bridgeton, NJ CBSA – starting in fiscal year 2022.  At that 
time, the wage index for the Vineland CBSA was 1.224 – 
higher than the wage index for the New Brunswick and 
Philadelphia CBSAs, but lower than the wage index for the 
New York City CBSA.  The Geographic Classification Review 
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Board granted that request, enabling Temple’s reclassification 
into the Vineland CBSA for fiscal years 2022 through 2024 
(October 1, 2021, through September 30, 2024).  Temple has 
until June 24, 2021 – forty-five days after the notice of 
proposed rulemaking for Fiscal Year 2022 – to withdraw from 
that reclassification.  See 42 C.F.R. § 412.273(c)(1)(ii), Fiscal 
Year 2022 Proposed Rule, 86 Fed. Reg. 25,070 (May 10, 
2021). 
 
Temple’s reclassification into the Vineland CBSA took on 
additional significance after the Secretary issued the final rule 
for Fiscal Year 2021.  That rule adopted OMB’s redefined New 
York City CBSA.  See Fiscal Year 2021 Final Rule, 85 Fed. 
Reg. at 58,743–44.  And through a table addendum to that rule, 
the Secretary reassigned Temple to the New Brunswick CBSA.  
See id. at 58,778 tbl. 2 (reassigning Temple based on its 
Medicare Provider Number (39-0027) and its case number 
before the Geographic Classification Review Board 
(21C0393)).   
 
That reassignment prompted this lawsuit.  Temple sued the 
Secretary and two other agency officials, contending that by 
statute, see 42 U.S.C. § 1395ww(d)(10)(D)(v), its 
reclassification into the New York City CBSA for wage index 
purposes should have been effective for three fiscal years – 
until September 30, 2023.  In resolving the parties’ competing 
summary judgment motions, the District Court entered 
judgment for the Secretary, reasoning that the Secretary’s 
reassignment of Temple to the New Brunswick CBSA 
qualified for Chevron deference and must be upheld.  See 
Temple Univ. Hosp., Inc. v. Azar, 2021 WL 431448, at *5–11 




Temple then filed this appeal, which has been expedited to 
accommodate Temple’s deadline of June 24, 2021, to 
withdraw from its reclassification into the Vineland CBSA.  
See 42 C.F.R. § 412.273(d)(4).  Temple disputes the 
application of Chevron deference, which the Secretary 
defends.  But the Secretary has also introduced a new 
dimension to this appeal: he contends that there is no subject-
matter jurisdiction due to the channeling requirement and 
Temple’s failure to present its challenge to the Provider 
Reimbursement Review Board.  In exercising appellate 
jurisdiction over the District Court’s “final decision,” 
28 U.S.C. § 1291; see Harris v. Kellogg Brown & Root Servs., 
Inc., 618 F.3d 398, 400 (3d Cir. 2010), we will vacate the 
judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss the 
complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
Federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction, and 
without subject-matter jurisdiction, they lack authority to 
address the merits of a case.  See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a 
Better Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998).  A challenge to 
subject-matter jurisdiction may be raised any time during a 
lawsuit (including for the first time on appeal).  See, e.g., 
United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625, 630 (2002); Grp. 
Against Smog & Pollution, Inc. v. Shenango Inc., 810 F.3d 116, 
122 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016).   
 
Here, although the Secretary did not dispute subject-matter 
jurisdiction in District Court, that defense has not been waived.  
See Fort Bend County v. Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1849 (2019).  
And subject-matter jurisdiction is lacking here.  Temple cannot 
invoke federal-question jurisdiction due to the Medicare Act’s 
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channeling requirement.  The remaining potential 
jurisdictional bases that Temple identifies fare no better. 
 
A. The Channeling Requirement Precludes Temple 
from Invoking Federal-Question Jurisdiction. 
 
The Medicare Act’s channeling requirement eliminates 
federal-question jurisdiction for claims “arising under” the 
Medicare Act.  See 42 U.S.C. § 405(h); id. § 1395ii.  The 
Supreme Court has construed the ‘arising under’ language of 
the Medicare Act’s channeling requirement “quite broadly.”  
Ringer, 466 U.S. at 615.  A claim arises under the Medicare 
Act when ‘“both the standing and the substantive basis for the 
presentation’ of a claim is the Medicare Act.”  Ill. Council, 
529 U.S. at 12 (quoting Ringer, 466 U.S. at 615); Weinberger 
v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749, 761 (1975); see also Cmty. Oncology 
All., Inc. v. Off. of Mgmt. & Budget, 987 F.3d 1137, 1142–43 
(D.C. Cir. 2021).6 
 
Temple’s claim satisfies those two elements.  First, Temple 
has standing to sue based on the Secretary’s action pursuant to 
his authority under the Medicare Act.  Reassigning Temple 
 
6 For other statutes, involving the jurisdictional balance 
between federal and state courts, the Supreme Court has 
construed ‘arising under’ differently than it has for the Social 
Security Act and the Medicare Act, which instead implicate 
administrative law principles, such as ripeness and exhaustion.  
Compare Gunn v. Minton, 568 U.S. 251, 257 (2013), Grable 
& Sons Metal Prods., Inc. v. Darue Eng’g & Mfg., 545 U.S. 
308, 314 (2005), and Am. Well Works Co. v. Layne & Bowler 
Co., 241 U.S. 257, 260 (1916), with Ill. Council, 529 U.S. at 
12, and Salfi, 422 U.S. at 761. 
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from the New York City CBSA to the New Brunswick CBSA 
constitutes an injury-in-fact (a lower wage index), fairly 
traceable to the Secretary’s action (the reassignment), and that 
injury-in-fact would be redressed by a favorable judicial 
decision (setting aside the reassignment).  See Valley Forge 
Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & 
State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) (articulating the three 
elements of Article III standing); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. 
Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1547 (2016) (explaining that for 
Article III standing, “[t]he plaintiff must have (1) suffered an 
injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the challenged 
conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely to be redressed 
by a favorable judicial decision”).  Second, the Medicare Act 
provides the substantive basis for Temple’s claim.  As 
amended, it provides that reclassifications “shall be effective 
for a period of 3 fiscal years,” 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1395ww(d)(10)(D)(v), and the merits of Temple’s claim 
depend on whether the Secretary’s reassignment decision 
violated that three-year durational mandate.  Thus, Temple 
cannot invoke federal-question jurisdiction here because its 
challenge to the New Brunswick CBSA reassignment arises 
under the Medicare Act.  
 
B. Temple Cannot Avail Itself of the Narrow 
Exception to the Channeling Requirement. 
 
Temple contends that it qualifies for the lone exception to 
the channeling requirement.  That exception applies only when 
application of the channeling requirement “would not simply 
channel review through the agency, but would mean no review 
at all.”  Ill. Council, 529 U.S. at 19.  The channeling 
requirement would have no such effect here.  Temple can 
dispute its reclassification to the New Brunswick CBSA before 
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the Provider Reimbursement Review Board because the wage 
index associated with that CBSA affects the amount of 
Temple’s Medicare reimbursements.  And under the Medicare 
Act, Temple can seek judicial review of the Board’s 
determination.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(1) (“Providers shall 
have the right to obtain judicial review of any final decision of 
the Board . . . by a civil action commenced within 60 days of 
the date on which notice of any final decision by the Board . . 
. is received.”).  Temple tacitly acknowledges as much.  The 
thrust of its argument is not that it has no opportunity for 
judicial review, but rather that it must surrender its subsequent 
reclassification to the Vineland CBSA to fully vindicate its 
three-year assignment to the New York City CBSA.  But that 
concern does not trigger the narrow exception to the 
channeling requirement because Temple has an opportunity for 
judicial review of its reassignment out of the New York City 
CBSA.  See Ill. Council, 529 U.S. at 22 (explaining that the 
channeling requirement cannot be circumvented on the 
grounds of “added inconvenience or cost in an isolated, 
particular case”); see also Sw. Pharmacy Sols., Inc. v. Ctrs. for 
Medicare & Medicaid Servs., 718 F.3d 436, 441 (5th Cir. 
2013) (“The fact that a plaintiff would suffer great hardship if 
forced to proceed through administrative channels before 
obtaining judicial review is insufficient to warrant application 
of the Illinois Council exception.”). 
 
Temple’s reference to the COVID-19 pandemic does not 
alter this conclusion.  Temple offers only conjecture and 
speculation for the proposition that the pandemic would have 
prevented or critically delayed administrative review of its 
claim.  Those concerns cannot overcome the near-absolute 
force of the channeling requirement – especially considering 
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the Provider Reimbursement Review Board’s publicly 
announced intention to keep operating on time.   
 
C. None of the Remaining Bases for Subject-Matter 
Jurisdiction Have Merit. 
 
No other statutory grant of subject-matter jurisdiction 
applies to Temple’s claim.  In its complaint, Temple also 
identifies the Declaratory Judgment Act, the Administrative 
Procedure Act, the mandamus-jurisdiction statute, and the 
Medicare Act as potential bases for subject-matter jurisdiction.  
  
The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201, 2202, 
does not independently grant subject-matter jurisdiction.  See 
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937) 
(“[T]he operation of the Declaratory Judgment Act is 
procedural only.”); Allen v. DeBello, 861 F.3d 433, 444 (3d 
Cir. 2017) (“The Declaratory Judgment Act does not, however, 
provide an independent basis for subject-matter jurisdiction; it 
merely defines a remedy.”).  
 
Nor does Temple gain any jurisdictional traction from the 
Administrative Procedure Act.  Although it waives sovereign 
immunity, see 5 U.S.C. § 702, and provides several causes of 
action, see, e.g., id. § 706, the Administrative Procedure Act 
includes no independent grant of subject-matter jurisdiction, 
see Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99, 107 (1977); Chehazeh v. 
Att’y Gen., 666 F.3d 118, 125 n.11 (3d Cir. 2012). 
   
The mandamus-jurisdiction statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1361, 
conditions its grant of jurisdiction on the unavailability of 
adequate alternative remedies.  See 33 Charles Alan Wright & 
Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure Judicial 
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Review § 8312 (2d ed. Apr. 2021 update) (“To qualify 
for mandamus, however, a litigant must satisfy three 
requirements that courts have characterized as jurisdictional: 
(1) a clear and indisputable right to relief, (2) that the 
government agency or official is violating a clear duty to act, 
and (3) that no adequate alternative remedy exists.” (citation 
and quotation marks omitted)); see also Ringer, 466 U.S. at 
616 (“The common-law writ of mandamus, as codified 
in 28 U.S.C. § 1361, is intended to provide a remedy for a 
plaintiff only if he has exhausted all other avenues of relief . . 
. .”); Semper v. Gomez, 747 F.3d 229, 250–51 (3d Cir. 2014).  
And here, Temple has an adequate alternative remedy through 
administrative appeal to the Provider Reimbursement Review 
Board.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(a)(1)(A)(ii); see also St. 
Francis Med. Ctr., 32 F.3d at 812.7   
 
Similarly, judicial review under the Medicare Act for 
reimbursement claims requires administrative exhaustion.  See 
42 U.S.C. § 1395oo(f)(1); see also Ill. Council, 529 U.S. at 24.  
And Temple did not present its wage-index challenge to the 
Provider Reimbursement Review Board.  Without such 
presentation, the Medicare Act does not authorize judicial 
review of Temple’s dispute. 
 
 
7 The All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a), likewise does not 
provide a basis for jurisdiction over Temple’s request 
mandamus relief: that statute does not independently grant 
subject-matter jurisdiction.  See Clinton v. Goldsmith, 526 U.S. 
529, 534–35 (1999); United States v. Apple MacPro Comput., 
851 F.3d 238, 244 (3d Cir. 2017). 
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* * * 
 
In sum, Temple’s challenge to its reassignment to the New 
Brunswick CBSA arises under the Medicare Act, and so it is 
subject to the Act’s channeling requirement.  Under that 
requirement, Temple cannot rely on federal-question 
jurisdiction as a basis for subject-matter jurisdiction.  And 
because Temple did not present its claim for administrative 
adjudication, it has no other valid basis for subject-matter 
jurisdiction.  We will therefore vacate the District Court’s 
judgment and remand with instructions to dismiss the 
complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. 
